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INSURANCE LAW-PROTECTING THE PUBLIC UNDER
MARYLAND'S COMPULSORY MOTOR VEHICLE
INSURANCE SCHEME: THE ABROGATION OF AN
INSURER'S COMMON-LAW RIGHT TO VOID AN
INSURANCE CONTRACT AB INITIO FOR A MATERIAL
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE POLICY APPLICATION.
Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 334 Md. 669, 641
A.2d 195 (1994).
I. INTRODUCTION
In face-to-face interviews, more than one out of five adults said
that it was acceptable to lie when completing an automobile insurance
application.' Such pervasive dishonesty is particularly disturbing to
insurers because the application is used, often exclusively, to deter-
mine whether or not to insure the driver. 2 A difficult legal question
arises when an insurer attempts to void an automobile insurance
policy ab initio3 for a material misrepresentation in the application
when the policy has been issued under a compulsory insurance
scheme. Such an attempt pits the insurer's common-law right to
rescind a contract obtained by a material misrepresentation 4 against
the goal of compulsory automobile insurance statutes - to assure
that all registered automobiles are insured.'
1. Study Finds Increasing Acceptance of Insurance Fraud, PROPERTY & CASUALTY
RISK & BENEFITS MANAGEMENT EDITION, Feb. 10, 1992, at 7 (citing a 1991
Roper Organization study).
.2. ANDREW JANQUITTO, MARYLAND MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 614 (1992) ("The
application is the window to the soul of insurance: it is through the application
process that the insurer assesses the risk and sets the premium.").
3. The latin term ab initio is defined as "[firom the beginning; from the first
act; from the inception." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 6 (6th ed. 1990). "An
agreement is said to be 'void ab initio' if it has at no time had any legal
validity." Id. Rescission of a contract is defined as follows: "To abrogate,
annul, avoid, or cancel a contract.... To declare a contract void in its
inception . . . ." Id. at 1306. In this Note, rescind will refer to declaring a
contract void in its inception.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981) ("If a party's manifes-
tation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation
by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract
is voidable by the recipient.").
5. 7 Am. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 37 (1980) ("[T]he purpose of a
compulsory [automobile] insurance statute is to assure, so far as possible, that
there will be no certificate of registration outstanding without concurrent and
Baltimore Law Review
In Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.,6 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland considered whether the enactment of Mary-
land's compulsory automobile insurance scheme altered an insurer's
common-law right to void a policy ab initio for a material misrep-
resentation in the policy application. 7 The court held that the insurer's
right had been statutorily abrogated with regard to claims made by
persons not involved in making the misrepresentation.' Furthermore,
the court held that the insurer's right to rescind had been abrogated
to the full extent of the policy coverage and not merely to the
minimum coverage required" by statute.9
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company (Atlantic Mutual) first is-
sued an automobile insurance policy to Raymond Van Horn in
October of 1985.10 One question in the policy application completed
by Van Horn asked whether the listed driver had any "physical
impairment."' ' Van Horn, an epileptic, indicated "No" in response.' 2
On January 14, 1987, the insured vehicle driven by Van Horn struck
and injured Douglas Wines, a bicyclist, who then made a claim for
compensation under the liability provisions of Van Horn's policy. 3
Van Horn was charged at the accident scene with driving while
intoxicated. 14
continuous liability insurance coverage .... "). Id. Compulsory liability insur-
ance statutes make it illegal to operate a vehicle without first furnishing proof
of insurance. Ruth Gastell, Compulsory Auto Insurance, INSURANCE INFOR-
MATION INSTITUTE, Feb. .1994, at 1. For a list of the jurisdictions with com-
pulsory liability insurance statutes, see infra note 53.
6. 334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195 (1994).
7. Id. at 671, 641 A.2d at 196.
8. Id. at 679, 641 A.2d at 199-200.
9. Id. at 679, 641 A.2d at 200.
10. Id. at 671, 641 A.2d at 196. The published opinion inadvertently indicated that
the policy was issued in 1984 rather than in 1985. Id. The parties' initial briefs
confirm that the policy was issued in 1985. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at
1, Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195
(1994) (No. 20, Sept. Term, 1990).
11. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 671, 641 A.2d at 196.
12. Id. at 671-72, 641 A.2d at 196.
13. Id. at 672, 641 A.2d at 196. The policy carried liability limits of $100,000 per
person/$300,000 per accident. Id. Van Horn made a claim on the collision
portion of the policy and was paid a few days later. Id.
14. Id. At the scene of the accident, Van Horn told the arresting officer that he
had taken medication for his epilepsy about two hours previously. Id. Atlantic
Mutual first learned of Van Horn's epilepsy from the police accident report
and later received additional information from a detailed statement by Van
Horn concerning his condition. Id. The court does not indicate in its opinion
when Van Horn's detailed statement was made or to whom it was directed.
The opinion also does not indicate whether Van Horn was truly intoxicated or
whether Van Horn's epilepsy medication produced or may have produced
symptoms similar to those of an intoxicated person.
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After discovering that Van Horn had made a misrepresentation
in his policy application, Atlantic Mutual notified Van Horn that it
was treating the policy as void from its inception and later refunded
all premiums paid on the policy. 5 The insurer sought a declaration
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County that the policy was void
from its inception and that it had been properly rescinded by the
company. 16
The trial court concluded that although Van Horn had made a
misrepresentation in the application, Atlantic Mutual had failed to
establish that the misrepresentation was material.17 On appeal, the
court of special appeals reversed the circuit court, holding that the
misrepresentation was material and that Maryland's compulsory au-
tomobile insurance statutes were not intended to abrogate the com-
mon-law right to rescind an insurance contract for a material
misrepresentation in the policy application."m
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the court of special
appeals, holding that Maryland's compulsory automobile insurance
statutes had abrogated Atlantic Mutual's right to void the policy ab
initio with regard to claims of persons not involved in making the
misrepresentation. 1 9 In support of its holding, the court offered the
overall policy objective of Maryland's automobile insurance scheme, 20
specific statutory provisions governing mandatory insurance 2' and the
cancellation of policies, 22 and the unanimous position of other juris-
dictions that have addressed the same issue.
23
II. BACKGROUND
Rescissions and cancellations have distinct technical definitions.
2 4
A rescission retrospectively terminates a contract to its beginning,
15. Id. at 672-73, 641 A.2d at 196-97.
16. Id. at 673, 641 A.2d at 197.
17. Id. at 675, 641 A.2d at 198. For further discussion of the trial court's reasoning,
see infra note 109 and accompanying text.
18. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 677, 641 A.2d at 198-99.
19. Id. at 679, 641 A.2d at 199-200.
20. Id. at 684, 641 A.2d at 202. The policy objective is to ensure that there be
insurance coverage for injuries sustained in automobile accidents. Id.
21. For a discussion of these statutory provisions, see id. at 684-85, 641 A.2d at
202.
22. Id. at 685-86, 641 A.2d at 202-03. These provisions allow, among other things,
only the prospective cancellation of policies. Id.
23. Id. at 687, 641 A.2d at 203-04. For a list of jurisdictions with compulsory
automobile insurance statutes, see infra note 53. See also C.C. Marvel, An-
notation, Rescission or Avoidance, for Fraud or Misrepresentation, of Com-
pulsory, Financial Responsibility, or Assigned Risk Automobile Insurance, 83
A.L.R.2D 1104 (1962 & Supp. 1991); 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance §
37 (1980).
24. 2 HENRY C. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS AND
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while a cancellation provides a prospective termination.2 Often,
however, the terms are used interchangeably, which makes their
application difficult and inconsistent. 26 The distinction becomes par-
ticularly important when statutes restricting cancellations are applied
to situations in which insurance companies attempt to rescind a
policy.
Under common law, a contract is voidable if it is procured by
a material misrepresentation by one of the parties. 27 Insurance con-
tracts, however, involve a unique combination of contract principles
and strict regulatory control. 28 Thus, absent statutory provisions to
the contrary, an insurer has a right to rescind an insurance contract
for a material misrepresentation in the policy application. 29 The test
for the materiality of a representation in an insurance contract is
described in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Samis.3 0 In Samis,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland described the test as a "question
[of] whether, if the true facts were known to the company at the
time of its issuance of the policy, it would have entered into the
contract." 3'
CANCELLATION OF WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS § 480, at 1157 (1916) ("The right of
an insurance company to cancel one of its policies is altogether different from
a right of rescission.").
25. See JANQurrTO, supra note 2, at 607 (citing Stiegler v. Eureka Life Ins. Co.,
146 Md. 629, 127 A. 397 (1925)); see also Reserve v. Duckett, 240 Md. 591,
214 A.2d 754 (1965) (discussing the difference between rescission and cancel-
lations). See generally 8B J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 5011 (1981 & Supp. 1994) (addressing the difference between
cancellations and rescissions).
26. See JANQurrTo, supra note 2, at 630. The two terms "have a myriad of
definitions in different contexts." Id.; see also, e.g., Erie Ins. v. Insurance
Comm'r, 84 Md. App. 317, 322, 579 A.2d 771, 773 (1990) (using the terms
"cancel" and "voidable" interchangeably).
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 4. A voidable contract
is capable of being enforced, as distinguished from a void contract, which has
no legal effect and, thus, is incapable of being enforced. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1573-74 (6th ed. 1990).
28. One commentator has described the relationship between contract principles
and the public role in insurance regulation as follows: "The law of insurance
falls within the broader field of contracts; however, given the State's ubiquitous
hand in the regulation of insurance in general, and motor vehicle insurance in
particular, any analysis of insurance cannot merely be contract centered. Rather,
it must be statute-centered, but contract-conscious." JANQUITTO, supra note 2,
at 8.
29. See WILLIAM R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE, ch. 7, § 67
(3d ed. 1951). In order to rescind a contract in Maryland, an insurer was
required to proceed without unreasonable delay, inform the insured of its
determination, and return all premiums received. See Stiegler v. Eureka Life
Ins. Co., 146 Md. 629, 127 A. 397 (1925). See generally Thomas R. Trenkner,
Automobile Insurance: Concealment or Nondisclosure of Physical Defects or
Conditions as Avoiding Coverage, 72 A.L.R.3D 804 (1976 & Supp. 1995).
30. 172 Md. 517, 192 A. 335 (1935).
31. Id. at 524, 192 A. at 338. A similar description of the test is found in Maryland
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Prior to the enactment of Maryland's compulsory automobile
insurance scheme, an insurer could exercise the common-law right to
rescind an automobile insurance policy for a material misrepresen-
tation in the application.3 2 Case law suggests that this right could be
exercised unilaterally by the insurer.3" The court of appeals has held
that a third-party claimant stands in no better position than the
insured when making a claim against an insurance policy.34 Thus, if
the insurer had grounds to deny coverage to the insured, the same
grounds permitted the insurer to deny coverage to an injured third
party.
3 5
In 1972, the Maryland General Assembly passed Maryland's
current compulsory automobile insurance scheme, which went into
Indemnity v. Steers, 221 Md. 380, 385, 157 A.2d 803, 806 (1960) ("The usual
test of whether or not a misrepresentation is material is whether it concerns a
fact that would affect the insurer's decision in entering into the contract and
in estimating the degree or character of the risk . . . ."); see 12A J.A.
APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 25, § 7294 (1981 & Supp. 1994)
(discussing a generally accepted materiality test).
32. Stumpf v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 Md. 696, 251 A.2d 362 (1969),
superseded by statute as discussed in Van Horn, 334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195
(1994); Josey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 252 Md. 274, 250 A.2d 256 (1969), superseded
by statute as discussed in Van Horn, 334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195 (1994); Erie
Ins. Exch. v. Lane, 246 Md. 55, 227 A.2d 231 (1967), superseded by statute
as discussed in Van Horn, 334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195 (1994); see Southern
Gen. Ins. Co. v. O'Keefe, 275 F. Supp. 107 (D. Md. 1967); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. West, 149 F. Supp. 289 (D. Md. 1957).
33. See Stumpf, 252 Md. at 713, 251 A.2d at 371 (addressing the steps an insurer
must take to rescind a policy (citing Stiegler v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 146 Md.
629, 642, 127 A. 397, 402 (1925))), superseded by statute as discussed in Van
Horn, 334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195 (1994). However, "ordinarily whether a
representation in an insurance application was true or false, or material to the
risk, is for the jury to determine." Lane, 246 Md. at 63, 227 A.2d at 236
(citing Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 212 Md. 202, 129 A,2d 103
(1956)), superseded by statute as discussed in Van Horn, 334 Md. 669, 641
A.2d 195 (1994). Thus, it appears that an insurer could unilaterally rescind a
policy for a material misrepresentation, but it remained a jury question whether
the representation was both false and material. See also JANQUITTO, supra note
2, at 625 ("Before Maryland adopted compulsory automobile insurance, several
cases seemingly allowed the insurer to rescind a policy ab initio by unilateral
action.").
34. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Godsey, 260 Md. 669, 674, 273 A.2d 431, 434 (1971)
("As the third party beneficiary of the insurance contract, the claimant stands
in the shoes of the insured wrongdoer and vis-a-vis the insurer his rights are
no greater than those of the insured's."). In Godsey, the insured and the
claimant collaborated to mislead the insurer about the details of the accident.
Id. at 673-74, 273 A.2d at 434; see also Stumpf v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 252 Md. 696, 251 A.2d 362 (1969), superseded by statute as discussed
in Van Horn, 334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195 (1994); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Smith,
197 Md. 160, 78 A.2d 461 (1951).
35. See, e.g., Stumpf, 252 Md. at 706, 251 A.2d at 367 (1969), superseded by
statute as discussed in Van Horn, 334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195 (1994).
effect on January 1, 1973.36 This comprehensive scheme is largely
codified, with later statutes, in the Transportation Article17 and the
Insurance Code.38 Maryland's automobile insurance scheme includes
compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance, 9 compulsory uninsured
motorist coverage, 40 no fault personal injury protection (PIP),4' a
state insurer of last resort (MAIF-Insured Division),42 and a public
fund that compensates people who are injured by uninsured vehicles
and who have no alternate source of recovery (MAIF-Uninsured
Division). 43 If a claim is made upon an insolvent insurer, a private
corporation known as the Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty
Corporation, or PCIGC, will stand in the shoes of the insolvent
insurer.4
In addition, Maryland's Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA)
may not issue or transfer registration of an automobile without
evidence that the required insurance coverage has been obtained.
4 If
insurance on an automobile lapses or terminates, the vehicle's reg-
istration is automatically suspended.4 6 It is illegal to drive or to
permit another to drive an uninsured or underinsured automobile.
4 7
Furthermore, the scheme strictly limits an insurer's ability to cancel
a policy of automobile liability insurance. 48
36. 1972 Md. Laws ch. 73. See generally JANQuiTTo, supra note 2 (discussing in
detail the provisions of Maryland's compulsory automobile insurance scheme);
MICPEL, AUTO INSURANCE 1991 (1991) (same).
37. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. §§ 17-101 to -110 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 234B, 240AA-42, 243-43N, 538-47A (1994 &
Supp. 1995).
39. MD. CODE ANN., TRAlsp. §§ 17-103(b)(1)-(2) (1992).
40. Id. § 17-103(b)(4) (requiring coverage described in MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§ 541 (1994 & Supp. 1995)). See generally Andrew Janquitto, Uninsured
Motorist Coverage in Maryland, 21 U. BALT. L. REV. 171 (1992); Donna
Maag, Comment, Compensation for Victims of Uninsured Motorist Accidents,
12 U. BALT. L. REV. 314 (1983).
41. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-103(b)(3) (1992) (requiring coverage described
in MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539 (1994)). Personal injury protection may
be waived by the first named insured. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539(a)
(1994).
42. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243B (1994). "The purpose of the Fund is to
provide automobile insurance to those eligible persons who are unable to obtain
it in the private market." Id. § 243B(a)(3).
43. Id. § 243H. For example, this fund would compensate a pedestrian with no
insurance of her own who was struck by an uninsured motor vehicle.
44. Id. § 504-19. The PCIGC stands in the shoes of the insolvent insurer after
the claimant has exhausted coverage under any other policies. Id. § 512(a); see
also infra note 52.
45. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-104 (1992).
46. Id. § 17-106 (1992 & Supp. 1995).
47. Id. § 17-107 (1992).
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 234A and 240AA (1994 Repl. Vol.). Section
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Maryland's motor vehicle insurance scheme has been described
as "the most comprehensive and intricate system in the United
States."'49 The policy of this extensive statutory scheme is to ensure,
as far as possible, that there be continuous insurance coverage on
all motor vehicles so that automobile owners and operators are able
to provide compensation for damages incurred in automobile acci-
234A prohibits cancellations based upon arbitrary, capricious, or unfairly
discriminatory reasons. Id. § 234A(a). Section 240AA provides in part:
(a) Compliance with article. - Except in accordance with the provi-
sions of this article, no insurer other than the Maryland Automobile
Insurance Fund shall (i) cancel or- fail to renew a policy of motor
vehicle liability insurance or a binder of motor vehicle liability insur-
ance, if the binder is in effect for 45 days or longer, issued in this
state, as to any resident of the household of the named insured, for
any reason other than nonpayment of premium....
(b) Notice to insured. - An insurer intending to take an action subject
to the provisions of this section shall, on or before 45 days prior to
the proposed effective date of the action, send written notice of its
intended action to the insured at his last known address .... All
other notices of action subject to the provisions of this section shall
be sent by certificate of mailing. The notice shall be in triplicate, and
shall state in clear and specific terms, on a form approved by the
Commissioner:
(5) The right of the insured to replace the insurance through
the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, and the current
address and telephone number of the Fund;
(d) Protest. - An insured shall have the right to protest the proposed
action of the insurer by signing 2 copies of the notice and sending
them to the Commissioner within 30 days after the date of mailing
of the notice ....
(e) Stay of proposed action. - A protest duly filed shall stay the
proposed action of the insurer pending a determination by the Com-
missioner, and the insurer shall maintain in force the same coverage
and premium in effect on the day the notice of proposed change was
sent until the final determination is made, provided that any lawful
premium due or becoming due prior to the determination is paid
Id. § 240AA; see also J.M. Zitler, Annotation, Cancellation of Compulsory
or "Financial Responsibility" Automobile Insurance, 44 A.L.R.4TH 13 (1986
& Supp. 1995); Notice of Insurer's Intention Not to Renew a Policy, 3 AM.
JUR. LEGAL FoRMs 2D, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE § 32:38 (1988); Notice of
Cancellation of Automobile Insurance Policy, 3 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D,
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE §§ 32:35-36 (1988); Request, by Insured, for Reason
for Cancellation or Nonrenewal of Automobile Insurance Policy, 3 AM. JUR.
LEGAL FORMS 2D, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE §§ 32:40-41 (1988); Statement of
Reason for Cancellation or Nonrenewal of Automobile Insurance Policy-In
Reply to Request by Insured, 3 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D, AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE § 32:42 (1988).
49. JANQUITTO, supra note 2, at 7.
19961
Baltimore Law Review
dents.5 0 The overall remedial purpose of the legislation is to protect
the public." It has been suggested that the General Assembly also
intended, by enacting the compulsory automobile insurance scheme,
"to shift the burden of caring for victims of motor vehicle accidents
from the State to the private sector." 52
Many jurisdictions with compulsory automobile insurance
statutes53 have held that an insurer cannot void a policy ab initio for
50. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 154,
416 A.2d 734, 736 (1980); see Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 240, 528 A.2d
912, 916 (1987) ("[T]here is harmony in the legislative design of Art. 48A,
which seeks to provide minimum compensation to the innocent victims of
motor vehicle accidents."); see also Jennings v. GEICO, 302 Md. 352, 357,
488 A.2d 166, 168 (1985) (invalidating a household exclusion clause as incon-
sistent with public policy); cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 307 Md. 631, 641-44, 516 A.2d 586, 591-92 (1986) (holding
that a household exclusion clause is invalid only to the extent of the minimum
statutory liability coverage).
51. Gartelman, 288 Md. at 154, 416 A.2d at 736.
52. JANQUITTO, supra note 2, at 2. The concept that Maryland's General Assembly,
by enacting compulsory insurance legislation, intended to shift the financial
burden of automobile accidents from the public to the private sector was also
suggested by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in the following dicta:
There is more than a modicum of appeal in [Petitioners'] contention
that the General Assembly's action in setting up a system of compul-
sory automobile insurance ... indicates its growing belief that all
those injured while using the highways of this State should be properly
recompensed. Furthermore, citizens of Maryland will have to bear the
brunt of the expense when the injured are forced to rely on public
aid for support due to their loss of employment and concomitant
inability to pay medical bills incurred as a result of their injuries -
even though the insurer has collected his fees to pay for just such
occurrences and very likely has set up a reserve fund containing all
the money necessary to reimburse the injured parties.
Belcher v. GEICO, 282 Md. 718, 726, 387 A.2d 770, 775 (1978). The statutory
creation of the PCIGC, MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 504-19 (1994), provides
additional support for the burden shifting argument. The PCIGC is a private
corporation which stands in the shoes of an insolvent insurer after any alternate
coverage the claimant may have is exhausted. Id. § 504(a). Thus, when an
insurer becomes insolvent, a claimant should first look to the next best private
insurer for compensation and then turn to the PCIGC. Furthermore, the right
to recover from the PCIGC is paramount to any right of recovery from
Maryland's public MAIF-Uninsured Division. See id. § 243H(a)(3)(vi); Mc-
Michael v. Robertson, 77 Md. App. 208, 215-16, 549 A.2d 1157, 1161 (1988)
(holding that both uninsured motorist benefits and personal injury protection
benefits already received by claimant were deductible from recovery against
PCIGC).
53. The following jurisdictions have enacted compulsory automobile insurance
statutes: Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. § 21.89.020 (1993); Arizona, Aiuz. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28-1161 to -1170 (1989 & Supp. 1995); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN.-
§ 23-89-201 to -209 (Michie 1992); Colorado, CoLo. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-
705 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38a-
[Vol. 25
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fraud or misrepresentation in the application to escape liability to a
third-party claimant. 4 In Teeter v. Allstate Insurance Co.," New
334 to -336 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §
2118 (1995); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2103 (1993); Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 324.021 (Harrison 1995); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 40-
6-10 (1994); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-104 (1993); Idaho, IDAHO
CODE § 49-1229 (1994); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 625, para. 5/7-601 (Smith-
Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 9-25-4-1 (Burns 1991
& Supp. 1994); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3104 (1993 & Supp. 1995);
Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-090 (Baldwin 1994); Louisiana, LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:861 (1989 & Supp. 1996); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 29, § 1601 (West Supp. 1995); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-
103 (1992); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 113A (West
1987 & Supp. 1996); Michigan, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.519 - .520
(West 1990); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B48 (1986 & Supp. 1996);
Missouri, Mo. REv. STAT. § 303.025 (1994); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §
61-6-301 (1995); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-507 to -511 (1993);
Nevada, NEV. REv. STAT. § 485.185 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); New Jersey,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39-6B-1 (West 1990); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-
5-205 (Michie 1994); New York, N.Y. VEH. & TRAr. LAW § 312 (Consol. 1986
& Supp. 1996); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -279.21 (1995);
North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-20 (1991); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47 § 7-601 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. §§
806.010 to .080 (1995); Pennsylvania, 75 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN. §§ 1701-1781
(Supp. 1995); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-20 (Law. Co-op. 1991);
South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-35-113 (1989); Texas, TEX.
TRANsp. CODE ANN. § 601.051 (West 1996); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-
12a-301 (1994); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 800 (1987 & Supp. 1994);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.30.020 (West Supp. 1996); West
Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 17D-2A-3 (1991); and Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 31-
4-103 (1994). Statutes in Ohio, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4509.101 (Baldwin
1994), and Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-31-1 to 31-32-21 (1995), have
some compulsory liability features. The following jurisdictions have financial
responsibility laws, which only require drivers to prove their ability to pay for
third-party losses after an accident, conviction, or judgment up to certain
amounts: Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 32-7-6, 32-7-22 (1992 & Supp. 1995);
California, CAL. VEH. CODE § 16050 (Deering Supp. 1996); Iowa, IOWA CODE
ANN. § 321A.5 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. §
63-15-11 (1989); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:2 (1993);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-12-105 (1993); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §
46.2-427 (1994); and Wisconsin, WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.24 to .48 (West 1991
& Supp. 1995). See also, Gastell, supra note 5, at 2-3.
54. Marvel, supra note 23, at 1104-05; see 7 Am. JuR. 2D § 37. This otherwise
universal rule does not apply in jurisdictions whose compulsory automobile
insurance schemes expressly allow liability avoidance for fraud or material
misrepresentations. See, e.g., Abrams v. General Ins. Co., 508 So. 2d 436,
437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (applying FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.409 (1983));
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crouch, 706 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1986) (applying Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-110 (1970)). But cf. Pearce
v. Southern Guaranty Ins. Co., 268 S.E.2d 623, 627-28 (Ga. 1980) (holding
that statutory cancellation provisions defeated statutory provision preventing
claimant recovery for material misrepresentations).
.55. 192 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1959), aff'd, 173 N.E.2d 47 (N.Y. 1961).
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York's appellate division established the rationale for this position.
First, the Teeter court reasoned that one aim of New York's com-
pulsory insurance scheme, continuous liability coverage for all vehi-
cles registered in the state, could not be reconciled with an insurer's
right to rescind a policy ab initio.5 6 Second, the court identified a
supervening public interest that restricted the rights of the parties
once the policy had been issued.5 7 Third, the New York court noted
that the statute's cancellation provisions applied to "termination for
any cause whatsoever," including rescission for fraud.5" The court
construed the statute's use of the term "cancellation" in its colloquial
rather than in its technical sense. Thus, a policy termination of any
type, including rescission, would have to comply with the statutory
cancellation provision, which required ten days notice to the insured.59
Finally, the court opined that an insurer who wishes to minimize the
risk of liability must investigate the applicant's truthfulness before
issuing a policy.6 The decision in Teeter abrogated the right of
rescission as to claims by both the insured and third parties.
6 1
Subsequent decisions in other compulsory insurance jurisdictions
have applied reasoning similar to that applied in Teeter to reach the
conclusion that an insurer cannot void a policy ab initio to escape
liability to a third-party claimant. 62 In Pearce v. Southern Guaranty
Insurance Co. ,63 the Supreme Court of Georgia determined that the
cancellation notice requirements of its compulsory automobile insur-
ance scheme preempted a statutory provision that allowed an insurer
56. Id. at 615.
57. Id. at 616. "A certificate of insurance constitutes a representation by the
insurance company to the public and to the State authorities that valid insurance
coverage is in effect." Id. at 617.
58. Id. at 615.
59. Id. at 616. Accordingly, the attempt to void the policy ab initio violated the
scheme's cancellation notice requirements. Id. at 619.
60. Id. at 617.
61. Id. at 619. The court rejected a distinction between the insured and third-party
claimants on the following three grounds: (1) the statutory language governing
the termination of coverage was all embracing; (2) the statutory scheme relied
upon penal sanctions for driving without the required insurance, which were
incompatible with an ability to rescind, whether the claimant was the insured
or a third party; and (3) while a statute recognizing the distinction could be
drawn, no such provisions existed. Id. at 617-18.
62. See, e.g., Pearce v. Southern Guarantee Ins. Co., 268 S.E.2d 623, 628 (Ga.
1980); American Underwriters Group v. Williamson, 496 N.E.2d 807, 810-11
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Ohio Farmers Ins. v. Michigan Mut. Ins., 445 N.W.2d
228, 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Atlantic Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bingham, 92
A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. 1952); Metropolitan Prop. & Liab. v. Insurance Comm'r, 535
A.2d 588, 594 (Pa. 1987); cf. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456
P.2d 674, 682 (Cal. 1969) (not a compulsory automobile insurance jurisdiction);
Rauch v. American Family Ins. Co., 340 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Wis. 1983) (same).
63. 268 S.E.2d 623, 628 (Ga. 1980).
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to avoid liability for a material misrepresentation in an insurance
application." Under the Georgia scheme, both liability and no-fault
insurance were compulsory; thus, the no-fault provisions could not
be separated from the liability provisions, and neither type of cov-
erage could be rescinded.65
In Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Clay,66 the Supreme
Court of Kansas held that the right to rescind liability coverage was
incompatible with the cancellation notice requirement for compulsory
liability coverage. The court held that non-compulsory protection
(such as collision coverage), however, could still be rescinded. 67 The
Clay court also explained that public policy favors the compensation
of innocent, injured third parties. 6 The court reasoned that the
insurer should not be allowed to avoid liability after the public had
innocently relied on the validity of the insurance contract.
69
In Barerra v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,70
the Supreme Court of California announced that "an automobile
liability insurer must undertake a reasonable investigation of the
insured's insurability within a reasonable period of time from the
acceptance of the application and the issuance of a policy."' 1 Absent
such an investigation, an injured third party could recover against
the insurer despite material misrepresentations concerning the appli-
cant's driving record.7 2 Thus, in Barerra, the insurer's failure to
conduct a reasonable investigation of the applicant's driving record
precluded the rescission of his policy.
73
64. Id. at 628 (holding automobile insurance policy could not be voided retrospec-
tively under GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2409 (1995), which expressly provided that
material misrepresentations could prevent recovery). See generally Barbara J.
Call, Third Party Problems with Falsified Insurance Applications, 24 TORT &
INs. L.J. 671, 675 (1989) (briefly discussing Pearce).
65. See Pearce, 268 S.E.2d at 628.
66. 811 P.2d 1202 (Kan. 1991).
67. Id. at 1207; see Dunn v. SafeCo Ins. Co., 798 P.2d 955 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
See generally John J. Knoll, Note, Kansas Automobile Insurance: Current
Issues and Problems, 29 WAsHBuRi L.J. 600, 621-23 (1990) (discussing the
issue in Kansas prior to Clay and Dunn).
68. See Clay, 811 P.2d at 1206-07 (citing Dunn v. SafeCo Ins. Co., 798 P.2d 955
(Kan. Ct. App. 1990); United Sec. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 348
N.W.2d 34 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)).
69. Id.
70. 456 P.2d 674 (Cal. 1969).
71. Id. at 677.
72. Id.
73. Id. In its determination of whether the investigation was reasonable, the
appellate court directed the trial court to weigh the cost, availability, and
administrative burden of making the investigation against the importance of
protecting the public from the consequences of those who drive with voidable
liability policies. Id. at 690.
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While California does not have a compulsory automobile insur-
ance scheme, there is a policy goal behind its Financial Responsibility
Law that is similar to compulsory insurance scheme goals. 74 Notably,
the California statutes recognize the technical distinction between a
"rescission" and a "cancellation"; 71 therefore, statutory notice re-
quirements applying to policy cancellations could not have been
applied to prevent a policy rescission in Barrera.76 Unlike the New
York court in Teeter, the California court distinguished claims made
by an injured third-party claimant from those made by the insured.
The California court reasoned that the right of the insurance company
to use the insured's material misrepresentations as a defense to a
claim by the insured "d[id] not conflict with the purpose of the
Financial Responsibility Law," which was meant to assure "a solvent
defendant for those innocently injured by the use of automobiles."
77
Despite the contrary positions taken by other jurisdictions, the
Attorney General of Maryland stated, in a 1986 opinion, that an
insurer "could seek a judicial rescission and a declaration that the
policy is void ab initio" based on a material misrepresentation in
the application. 78 The Attorney General opined that, while an insurer
could not unilaterally rescind a policy, both a cancellation in accor-
dance with the applicable statutory provisions and a judicial rescission
remained viable alternatives.79
The Opinion of the Attorney General examined the cancellation
and nonrenewal provisions of the Maryland statutes, 0 reviewed the
common-law background of rescission,81 and discussed the rationale
applied by the New York court in Teeter.8 2 The opinion, however,
declined to follow the reasoning of the Teeter court. 3 Based largely
upon the principle that statutes in derogation of the common law
should be strictly construed,8 the Attorney General concluded that
74. Id. at 682-83. "The law 'aims to make owners of motor vehicles financially
responsible to those injured by them in the operation of such vehicles."' Id.
(citing Wildman v. GEICO, 307 P.2d 359, 364 (Cal. 1957)).
75. Id. at 678 n.3.
76. Id. See generally Call, supra note 64, at 675-76 (criticizing Barrera).
77. Barrera, 456 P.2d at 689.
78. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. 173 (1986).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 173-76.
81. Id. at 176-77.
82. Id. at 177-78.
83. Id. at 179 ("[W]e do not believe that we need to go as far as did the court
in Teeter and conclude that the common law right to rescission has been
entirely supplanted by the statutory scheme."). Id.
84. Id. at 179 n.6 (citing Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 303,
396 A.2d 255, 260 (1979)). The principle that statutes in derogation of the
common law should be strictly construed stems from the presumption that the
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"[a]bsent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary, we
believe that the right to seek judicial rescission of an automobile
liability insurance policy remains intact." 85
The comprehensive nature of Maryland's compulsory automobile
insurance scheme8 6 and this opinion by the Attorney General of
Maryland, which ran contrary to the overwhelming weight of au-
thority in other jurisdictions, 7 served as background for a judicial
determination of the rescission question in Maryland.
III. THE INSTANT CASE
Raymond Van Horn began having epileptic seizures in 1983.88
Yet, in 1984, he denied having any physical disability, other than
poor vision, in an MVA driver's license renewal application.8 9 In
October of 1985 Van Horn signed and submitted an application for
automobile insurance with the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company. 9°
The application, which listed Van Horn as the only driver, contained
a list of questions with "Yes" or "No" response boxes. 9' One
question, asking whether the "driver listed above" had "a physical
impairment," was answered with an "X" in the "No" box.92 A six
month policy carrying injury liability limits of $100,000 per person/
$300,000 per accident was issued on October 4, 1985 and was renewed
at six month intervals thereafter.93 On January 14, 1987, while driving
his insured vehicle, Van Horn collided with a bicyclist, Douglas
Wines. 94 Van Horn was charged at the accident scene with driving
while intoxicated, and he told the investigating officer that he had
legislature is aware of the common law when it enacts a statute and would
expressly override the common-law rule if it intended. See SUTHERLAND STAT.
CONST. § 61.01 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing strict construction of statutes in
derogation of the common law). This rule is followed in Maryland, E.g., Bruce
v. Dyer, 309 Md. 421, 524 A.2d 777 (1987). However, it is also a general rule
of statutory construction that a remedial statute should be construed liberally
in order to advance the remedy. State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 328 A.2d 737
(1974); see SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 60.01 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing liberal
construction of remedial statutes). The remedial purpose of Maryland's man-
datory automobile insurance statute has been held to require liberal construc-
tion. Tucker v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 517 A.2d 730 (1986).
85. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. at 179.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 36-52.
87. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
88. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 672, 641 A.2d at 196.
89. Id. at 674, 641 A.2d at 197.
90. Id. at 671, 641 A.2d at 196.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 671-72, 641 A.2d at 196.
94. Id. at 672, 641 A.2d at 196.
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taken medication for his epilepsy two hours earlier. 95 Atlantic Mutual
was subsequently informed of the accident and began its investigation,
which included a review of the police report. 96 Having discovered the
information regarding Van Horn's epilepsy in the report, the insurer
obtained more detailed information about its policyholder's medical
condition 97
The following claims were made on the policy: (1) Van Horn
made a claim under the policy's collision coverage and was paid a
few days later; 98 and (2) Douglas Wines made a claim under the
policy's liability coverage. 99 After sending Van Horn a "reservation
of rights" letter'0° in March and renewing his policy for a six month
period (April-October 1987), Atlantic Mutual sent a letter to Van
Horn stating that his policy was being treated as void from its
inception due to the existence of a material misrepresentation in his
application.' 0' The result of treating the policy as void from its
inception would have been to deny the victim, Douglas Wines, any
recovery under the policy.
On April 29, 1987, Atlantic Mutual filed a complaint in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County seeking a declaratory judgment
that Van Horn's policy was void from its inception and had been
properly rescinded. 102 Van Horn counterclaimed, seeking a declaration
that the policy was valid when the accident occurred and that Atlantic
Mutual's attempt to void the policy ab initio was improper. 103 Fol-
lowing the commencement of the action, Atlantic Mutual sent Van
Horn a check for $1,190.86, which was alleged to reflect the sum of
the premiums that Van Horn had paid on his policy.1°4 Van Horn
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Atlantic Mutual obtained a detailed statement from Van Horn in which he
described his condition. Thereafter, Atlantic Mutual obtained Van Horn's
medical records. Id.
98. Id. Atlantic Mutual did not contest this claim and, hence, did not seek its
return.
99. Id.
100. A "reservation of rights" letter protects the insurer against an estoppel of its
attempt to deny coverage for a failure to act promptly when a possible absence
of coverage is discovered. See 7C APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 25, §
4693.
101. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 672-73, 641 A.2d at 196-97.
102. Id. at 673, 641 A.2d at 197. The named defendants were Raymond J. Van
Horn, Douglas Wines, University of Maryland Medical System Corporation
(which treated Wines), and the Maryland Medical Assistance Program, Mary-
land Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (which paid a portion of
Wines's medical expenses). Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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did not cash the check. 05 Atlantic Mutual did not seek a return of
the collision claim paid to Van Horn.106
At the Van Horn trial, the circuit court, sitting without a jury,
determined that although Van Horn made a misrepresentation in his
policy application, the misrepresentation was not material. 0 7 Citing
the materiality test set forth by the court of appeals in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Samis,l08 the trial judge found that Atlantic
Mutual had failed to persuade the court that it would not have issued
the policy if it had known Van Horn had epilepsy. 109 Thus, after
applying standard contract principles, the trial court stated that
Atlantic Mutual could not rescind the policy ab initio because Van
Horn's misrepresentation was not material." 0
In reversing the circuit court's decision, the court of special
appeals stated that 'since epilepsy can cause at least momentary
loss of consciousness, on the very face of it the existence of such a
condition is material to the risk involved in an automobile liability
insurance policy."'"" Furthermore, the court held that Maryland's
compulsory automobile insurance statutes were not intended to ab-
rogate an insurer's right of rescission "'for a material misrepresen-
tation that induced the insurer to issue the policy."'
' 2
The court of appeals first heard oral argument in this case on
October 10, 1990.11 Thereafter, the court ordered that the case be
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 675-76, 641 A.2d at 198. Thus, the circuit court did not address the
issue of whether enactment of Maryland's compulsory insurance scheme had
abrogated Atlantic Mutual's common-law right of rescission.
108. 172 Md. 517, 528, 192 A. 335, 339 (1937); see supra notes 30-31 and accom-
panying text.
109. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 676, 641 A.2d at 198. At the close of the trial, counsel
for Atlantic Mutual conceded that the company would insure people with
epilepsy if they met MVA requirements. Id. at 675, 641 A.2d at 197-98. The
trial court found that Atlantic Mutual had failed to persuade the court of the
materiality of Van Horn's misrepresentation in two respects: First, if Van Horn
had informed Atlantic Mutual of his epilepsy in the insurance application,
there was no evidence to indicate Atlantic Mutual would not have issued the
policy when it discovered that he had not reported his condition to the MVA.
Second, there was no evidence that the MVA would have refused to license
Van Horn if he had disclosed his condition when renewing his driver's license.
Id. at 675-76, 641 A.2d at 198.
110. Id. at 675, 641 A.2d at 198.
111. Id. at 677, 641 A.2d at 199 (citing the unreported opinion by the court of
special appeals).
112. Id. (citing the unreported opinion by the court of special appeals).
113. The following three questions were presented in the defendants' petition for a
writ of certiorari:
1. Should the burden of proof as to whether a misrepresentation
made by the insured, Raymond J. Van Horn, in his application for
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reargued in consideration of more specific questions dealing with the
rescission of automobile liability policies." 4 The case was reargued
on May 7, 1992. In holding that Maryland's compulsory automobile
insurance scheme abrogated an insurer's common-law right of re-
scission with regard to innocent third-party claimants, the court relied
on the legislative purpose of the scheme," 5 the requirement that
insurance be maintained during the registration period, 116 and the
statutory provisions governing policy terminations." 7 The decisions
of similarly situated jurisdictions on the same issue lent further
support to the court's holding."'
In Van Horn, the court of appeals discussed the following aspects
of Maryland's automobile insurance statutes in order to identify the
scheme's legislative purpose: the "Required Security" subtitle to the
Transportation Article," 9 the MAIF-Insured Division's operation as
insurance was material have been on the insurer, Atlantic Mutual?
2. Was the decision of the trial judge clearly erroneous when he
found that the misrepresentation made by Raymond J. Van Horn in
his application for insurance was not material?
3. Assuming arguendo that there was a material misrepresentation
in Van Horn's application for insurance, should the policy be held
not to be void ab initio as against Wines, an injured third party?
Id.
114. Id. at 678, 641 A.2d at 199. The court asked the following additional questions:
1. Is the law that generally permits rescission of an insurance contract
for first-party coverage without the necessity of showing a causal
relationship between the misrepresentation and the loss applicable to
third-party motor vehicle insurance coverage cases, or should rescission
be permitted as to third parties only upon a showing of such causal
relationship?
2. Has Maryland's compulsory motor vehicle insurance law abro-
gated the common-law right of an insurer to rescind an automobile
insurance policy for fraud or material misrepresentation after an
accident covered by the policy has occurred?
3. If so, should the right of rescission be denied:
(a) as to third-party coverage only, and not as to first-party coverage?
(b) only to the limits of financial responsibility required by
State law, or as to the entire policy coverage?
4. Is the rescission of a motor vehicle insurance policy subject to
the provisions of §§ 234A, 240AA, and 240D of Article 48A of the
Maryland Code?
Id.
115. Id. at 684, 641 A.2d at 202. The legislative purpose of the scheme is "that
there be continuous insurance policy coverage for injuries incurred in motor
vehicle accidents." Id.
116. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-104(b) (1992)).
117. Id. at 685, 641 A.2d at 202 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 234A and
240AA (1994)).
118. Id. at 687, 641 A.2d at 203-04.
119. Id. at 680-81, 641 A.2d at 200-01 (citing MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 17-101
to -110 (1992 & Supp. 1995)).
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a state insurer of last resort' 20 provisions governing policy cancella-
tions, 12' no-fault PIP coverage, 22 and mandatory uninsured motorist
insurance. 23 The court opined that "[t]hese statutory provisions
complement each other in achieving the legislative purpose that there
be continuous insurance policy coverage for injuries incurred in motor
vehicle accidents. Recognition of a common-law contract right to
void a motor vehicle insurance policy ab initio is inconsistent with
this legislative purpose."14
The court also noted that the precursor to Maryland's compul-
sory insurance scheme, the Assigned Risk Plan, 125 contained language
expressly preserving an insurer's right of rescission for a material
misrepresentation in procuring the insurance. 26 Because no such
provision was inserted when the current scheme was enacted, the
court concluded that the former provision regarding recision for
material representations was inconsistent with the new scheme's leg-
islative purpose. 127
The court applied the present scheme's statutory provisions and
legislative purpose to the facts in Van Horn and reasoned that if
Atlantic Mutual were allowed to void the policy ab initio, Van
Horn's automobile would be retrospectively uninsured for a two-year
period, 128 which "would flatly violate the statutory requirement that
one 'shall maintain' the insurance 'during the registration pe-
riod'. . ' '129
The court also reasoned that an insurer's right to void a policy
ab initio was inconsistent with the scheme's policy cancellation pro-
cedures. 130 In particular, the court noted that only prospective can-
120. Id. at 681, 641 A.2d at 201 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243 (1994 &
Supp. 1995)).
121. Id. at 681-82, 641 A.2d 201 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 240AA (1994)).
122. Id. at 682-83, 641 A.2d at 201 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 539, 540
(1994)).
123. Id. at 683, 641 A.2d at 201-02 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c) (1994
& Supp. 1995)).
124. Id. at 684, 641 A.2d at 202.
125. This statutory scheme was designed to help individuals obtain motor vehicle
insurance policies from insurance companies. Id. at 683, 641 A.2d at 202
(citing 1972 Md. Laws ch. 73, at 290-93) (repealed).
126. "No eligible applicant may be refused or canceled by the insurer for under-
writing reasons, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall prevent . . .
rescission for . . . material misrepresentation in procuring the insurance." Van
Horn, 334 Md. at 683-84, 641 A.2d at 202 (quoting 1972 Md. Laws ch. 73,
at 292 § (v) (repealed)).
127. See Van Horn, 334 Md. at 684, 641 A.2d at 202.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-104(b) (1992)).
130. Id. at 685, 641 A.2d at 202; see supra note 48.
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cellations were permitted. Thus, a rescission, which the court
considered a "retroactive cancellation," was inconsistent with the
statutory scheme.' The court decided not to recognize a technical
distinction between the two terms and applied the statutory provisions
governing policy cancellations to this case of an attempted rescis-
sion. 1
3 2
In support of its holding, the court of appeals also pointed
towards decisions in other compulsory insurance jurisdictions that
did not expressly permit an insurer to void a policy ab initio.'33 The
court adopted the position that, when innocent third parties are
involved, rescission ab initio is inconsistent with the compulsory,
statutory automobile insurance scheme. 3 4 The court placed primary
reliance on the New York opinion in Teeter v. Allstate Insurance
Co., '3 pointing to that court's reasoning that rescission ab initio
violated the New York statute's prospective cancellation provisions
and was irreconcilable with the compulsory insurance requirement
that insurance be continuously maintained. 3 6 The Van Horn court
also adopted the position of the Supreme Court of Kansas in Con-
tinental Western Insurance Co. v. Clay'37 that compulsory automobile
liability statutes with no-fault provisions further the public policy
that one who suffers a loss due to an automobile accident shall have
a source and a means of recovery.'38 The Van Horn court found
additional support for this public policy rationale in reasoning ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Sentry v. Indemnity
Co. v. Sharif.3 9 Finally, the court of appeals, in Van Horn, quoted
with approval an Arkansas case, Ferrell v. Columbia Mutual Casualty
Insurance Co.,140 in which the court reasoned that "[i]f an insurer
could unilaterally rescind coverage, unscrupulous insurers could hold
the threat over the head of third party claimants in an attempt to
bargain down their claims .... ,,141
131. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 685, 641 A.2d at 202.
132. See id. at 685-86 n.6, 641 A.2d at 202-03 n.6. See generally supra note 24-26
and accompanying text.
133. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 687, 641 A.2d at 203-04.
134. Id. at 687, 641 A.2d at 204.
135. Id. (citing Teeter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 192 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1959), affd, 173
N.E.2d 47 (N.Y. 1961)).
136. Id. at 688-89, 641 A.2d at 204.
137. 811 P.2d 1202 (Kan. 1991).
138. 334 Md. at 689-90, 641 A.2d at 205 (citing Continental Western Ins. Co. v.
Clay, 811 P.2d 1202 (Kan. 1991); Dunn v. SafeCo Ins. Co., 798 P.2d 955
(Kan. Ct. App. 1990)).
139. Id. at 690-91, 641 A.2d at 205 (citing Sentry Indem. Co. v. Sharif, 282 S.E.2d
907 (Ga. 1981)).
140. 816 S.W.2d 593 (Ark. 1991).
141. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 691, 641 A.2d at 205-06 (quoting Ferrell v. Columbia
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 816 S.W.2d 593, 595-96 (Ark. 1991)).
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The court of appeals also held that Atlantic Mutual's right to
rescind its policy ab initio had been abrogated as to the entire policy
coverage and not merely as to the statutorily required minimum
coverage. 42 Thus, the insurer was required to make available the full
$100,000 per person/$300,000 per accident liability limits provided
in Van Horn's policy, rather than only the $20,000/$40,000 minimum
liability coverage required by the statute.
4
1
Atlantic Mutual argued that if it were liable for Wines's claim,
its liability should not extend beyond the minimum liability limits
required by statute.' 44 The company's argument was based on the
court of appeals's holding in State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 41 In State Farm, the court of
appeals held that a contractual provision that violated the public
policy of Maryland's compulsory automobile insurance scheme was
invalid to the extent of the conflict between the contractual provision
and the scheme's stated public policy.' 46 Based on the State Farm
holding, Atlantic Mutual argued that its contract with Van Horn
should only be enforced to the extent that it supported public policy,
that is, to the extent of the minimum coverage required by statute. 4
The contractual provision at issue in State Farm was a household
exclusion clause that excluded coverage for injury to the insured and
to members of the insured's family.' 48 Based on the invalidity of the
household exclusion clause, the insurer in that case was required to
provide the insured with coverage up to the $20,000/$40,000 mini-
mum liability required by statute, but it was not required to pay any
amount above the statutory minimums. 149
The Van Horn court rejected Atlantic Mutual's argument for
two reasons. First, the court distinguished State Farm on the basis
that the State Farm holding invalidated a contractual provision that
the insurer and insured had agreed upon, thereby forcing the insurer
to provide coverage for which it received no premium. 50 The court
reasoned that the situation in Van Horn was different because the
parties to the policy had agreed to the full $100,000/$300,000 liability
142. Id. at 696, 641 A.2d at 208.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 644, 641 A.2d at 207.
145. 307 Md. 631, 516 A.2d 586 (1986).
146. Id. at 694, 516 A.2d at 592; see also Jennings v. Government Employees Ins.,
302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166 (1985) (invalidating household exclusion clauses).
147. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 694, 641 A.2d at 207.
148. State Farm, 307 Md. at 646, 516 A.2d at 586 (citing Jennings v. GEICO, 302
Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166 (1985)). Household exclusion clauses typically exclude
coverage for injury to the insured or members of the insured's household. Id.
at 633, 516 A.2d at 587.
149. Id. at 643-44, 516 A.2d at 592.
150. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 695, 641 A.2d at 208.
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limits, and Atlantic Mutual received a premium based on that cov-
erage. '5 Second, the court concluded that the cancellation statutes
applicable to Van Horn's policy applied to the full policy coverage
and not merely to the minimum coverage required by statute.
5 2
An important question not answered in the Van Horn decision
was whether an insurer's right to rescind a policy for a material
misrepresentation in the application would be denied when the claims
of injured third parties were not involved.'53 This would have been
the situation in Van Horn if Atlantic Mutual had refused to pay a
claim by Van Horn under his policy's collision, personal injury, or
uninsured motorist coverage. That question was not at issue in Van
Horn,15 4 and the court expressly declined to decide it.' 51 The court,
however, specifically asked that question when it ordered that the
case be reargued.'
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
The principal question addressed in Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual
Insurance Co. was whether the insurer had a right to rescind coverage
as to the claim of Douglas Wines, an injured third party. The court's
holding on this issue was well-supported and sound. While the
General Assembly did not expressly preclude the common-law right
to rescind a policy for a material misrepresentation in the application,
the legislative policy of the insurance scheme'5 7 indicated that the
General Assembly intended to abrogate the insurer's right of rescis-
sion with regard to innocent third-party claimants.
The legislative purpose of Maryland's compulsory automobile
insurance scheme is to assure a means of recovery to persons who
incur damages in automobile accidents. 5 This public policy provides
the most compelling justification for the court's holding. Although
the scheme provides a means of recovery for injuries caused by
uninsured Maryland drivers, 59 which Van Horn would have been if
a rescission were permitted, the scheme does not allow a driver to
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 679, 641 A.2d at 200.
154. Id. at 678-79, 641 A.2d at 199 ("This litigation does not concern any claim
under the policy made by or on behalf of Van Horn.").
155. Id. at 679, 641 A.2d at 200 ("[Wjhether the material misrepresentation would
furnish a valid defense to a claim made by Van Horn is a question not
presented by this case, and we do not decide it.").
156. Id. at 678, 641 A.2d at 199; see also supra note 114 (listing the four reargument
questions).
157. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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drive while uninsured. If the insurer were allowed to rescind the
insured's policy whenever innocent third parties asserted claims under
it, a legislative exception would be created in a scheme that is intended
to be all encompassing. While the insurance company may also be
an innocent party,16 Maryland's compulsory automobile insurance
scheme is intended to protect the public, not the insurer.
The court's reliance on specific statutory provisions provides less
compelling support for its holding than its reliance on the scheme's
overall purpose. The Van Horn court reasoned that if Atlantic Mutual
were allowed to rescind the policy, Van Horn's automobile would
have been left uninsured for a two-year period.' 6' By leaving Van
Horn with no means available at the time of the insurance company's
action to remedy the situation, the insured would be violating the
requirement that insurance be maintained during the registration
period. 162 An argument can be made, however, that the vehicle was
rendered uninsured for the two-year period because Van Horn mis-
represented his physical condition in the policy application.
The court's reliance on the statfitory cancellation provisions is
subject to criticism on the ground that the court should have rec-
ognized the distinction between a "cancellation" and a "rescission."
The technical distinction between the two terms is well established; 161
however, the court noted that the existence of a distinction between
the terms does not reveal an intention by the General Assembly or
the Maryland courts to recognize the distinction.M It is plausible
that the General Assembly intended the term "cancellation" to refer
to any action that terminates or nullifies insurance coverage. The
fact that the terminology is often used interchangeably 65 bolsters this
contention because it underscores the imprecision with which the
terms are used. Accordingly, the court's determination that a rescis-
sion is a retrospective cancellation, which is prohibited by the can-
cellation notice requirements, can be justified.
The decision not to recognize the distinction between a cancel-
lation and a rescission is the stronger of the two grounds upon which
160. See Van Horn, 334 Md. at 704 n.3, 641 A.2d at 212 n.3 (McAuliffe, J.,
dissenting) (discussing circumstances when insurer would be "innocent").
161. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 684, 641 A.2d at 202 (citing MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP.
§ 17-104(b)).
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
164. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 685-86 n.6, 641 A.2d at 202-03 n.6 (discussing Maryland
statutes and case law that do not support a distinction between "rescission"
and "cancellation"). But see Stiegler v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 146 Md. 629,
646, 127 A. 397, 404 (1925) ("The policy had no term permitting a cancellation
by the assured, and its sole right to avoid the policy was its option of
rescission.").
165. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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the court based its determination that Atlantic Mutual had to make
the full liability coverage specified in the policy available. First, the
court contended that Atlantic Mutual received a premium based on
the full $100,000/$300,000 liability coverage; I'6 however, the court
did not recognize that Atlantic Mutual also based the amount of its
premium on the belief that Van Horn had no physical disability.
Consequently, the contention that the relationship between the pre-
mium and the coverage required the insurer to provide the full
liability limits was questionable. Second, the court asserted that the
statutory provisions governing cancellations applied to the full, agreed
upon policy coverage. 67 Having decided that the cancellation notice
statutes applied to rescissions, the court properly determined that no
coverage in the policy could be terminated without strict adherence
to the statutes.1
68
The court rejected Atlantic Mutual's argument that State Farm
required the insurer to provide coverage only to the extent that its
rescission was inconsistent with the public policy of the insurance
scheme.1 69 Had the court accepted Atlantic Mutual's approach, Wines's
recovery would have been limited to the $20,000 per person liability
limit mandated by statute, 70 instead of the $100,000 per person limit
specified in Van Horn's policy.
The decision that an insurer cannot void an automobile liability
policy issued under a compulsory insurance scheme when an innocent
third-party claimant is involved is consistent with the unanimous
position taken by other jurisdictions. 7' Disagreement exists, however,
when the claim is brought by the insured who made the misrepre-
sentation. 72 This question of first-party coverage was not at issue in
Van Horn, and the court expressly declined to decide it; 73 however,
the reasoning used in support of the court's holding could substan-
tially affect the alternatives available when that question is ultimately
decided.
The Van Horn court reasoned that permitting a rescission would
violate the statutory requirement that the required insurance coverage
be continuously maintained. 74 This requirement also applies to first-
166. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 695, 641 A.2d at 208.
167. Id.
168. Id.; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 240AA(a) (1994) (prohibiting cancellations
or reductions of coverage except in accordance with the section's notice
requirements).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 144-47.
170. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. § 17-103(b)(1) (1992 Repl. Vol.).
171. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
172. See Van Horn, 334 Md. at 693 n.8, 641 A.2d at 206 n.8.
173. Id. at 679, 641 A.2d at 200.
174. Id. at 684, 641 A.2d at 202 (citing MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-104(b) (1992
Repl. Vol.)).
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party PIP 75 and to first-party uninsured motorist coverage, 176 which
suggests that the rescission of those types of coverage would also be
precluded. The court also relied on statutory provisions that allow
only prospective cancellations. 177 Those provisions apply only to
motor vehicle liability insurance. 178 Maryland's policy regarding man-
datory first-party coverage 179 and optional first-party collision cov-
erage remains an open question. 1
80
Judge McAuliffe, in his dissenting opinion, offered an alternative
to the position taken by the majority in Van Horn.' Judge McAuliffe
argued that an insurer's right of rescission should not be abrogated
in any instance absent a clear expression to the contrary by the
General Assembly.8 2 While this approach would protect against
unfair risk assumption by an insurer,'183 it would not provide sufficient
protection to injured claimants, the group the scheme is intended to
protect." 4 Under this approach, Van Horn would have been uninsured
at the time of the accident, and Wines would have had to turn to
the limited compensation available from the MAIF-Uninsured Divi-
sion.8 5 Naturally, this approach would eliminate coverage for claims
by the insured as well.
1 6
175. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 17-103(b)(3) (1992 Repl. Vol.) (specifying
personal injury protection (PIP) as required security, unless waived); id. § 17-
104(b) (compelling maintenance of required security during vehicles registration
period).
176. See id. § 17-103(b)(4) (specifying uninsured motorist coverage as required
security); id. § 17-104(b) (compelling maintenance of required security during
vehicle's registration period).
177. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 685, 641 A.2d at 202 (citing Md. Ann. Code art. 48A,
§§ 234A, 240AA (1994 Repl. Vol.)).
178. Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 240AA(a) (1994 Repl. Vol.).
179. Compare Teeter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 192 N.Y.S.2d 610, 617-18 (1959) (holding
that no insurance policy could be rescinded), aff'd, 173 N.E.2d 47 (N.Y. 1961)
with United Sec. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 348 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1984) (holding that both mandatory first-party coverage and optional
first-party coverage could be rescinded).
180. Compare United Sec. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 348 N.W.2d 34, 36
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that both mandatory first-party coverage and
optional first-party coverage could be rescinded) with Dunn v. SafeCo Ins.
Co., 798 P.2d 955, 959-60 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (appearing to distinguish
between compulsory first-party coverage and optional first-party coverage).
181. 334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195 (1994) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 707, 641 A.2d at 213 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting) ("In the absence of
any express resolution of the question by the legislature, I would not presume
an intent to abrogate the common law .... ").
183. Id. at 704, 641 A.2d at 212 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
184. Judge McAuliffe recognized this point in his dissent but also noted that
prohibiting rescission was unfair to an innocent insurer. Id. at 703-04, 641
A.2d at 212.
185. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243(l) (1994 Repl. Vol.). The MAIF-Uninsured
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Douglas Wines suggested an additional alternative in the brief
he initially submitted to the court of appeals.'8 7 Wines's approach
would allow a rescission only if the material misrepresentation were
related to the proximate cause of the accident. 8" While logical in
some respects, this approach is not supported by the statutory scheme.
Under this approach, because epilepsy was not the proximate cause
of the accident, a rescission would not have been allowed in Van
Horn, and a claim by either Wines or Van Horn would have been
covered.
V. CONCLUSION
Maryland's compulsory insurance statutes require that every
motor vehicle registered in the state be insured. Given the public's
dishonesty when completing automobile insurance applications, 89 there
is a high likelihood that many of the required insurance policies were
procured by material misrepresentations. The existence and extent of
an insurer's obligation to bear the expense incurred following an
automobile accident is, therefore,, an important issue. Considering
the comprehensive and intricate nature of Maryland's motor vehicle
insurance scheme, and the recognized legislative purpose of ensuring
compensation to those injured in automobile accidents, the decision
of the court of appeals in Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance
Co. is well-founded and fair.
Furthermore, the reasoning the court employed to reach its
decision has important implications for future litigation. This rea-
soning suggests that Maryland may join the jurisdictions that have
held that rescission of an automobile insurance policy is impermissible
even when innocent third-party claims are not involved. Such a result
would be desirable in cases where personal injuries are involved.
When optional first-party collision and comprehensive coverage are
at issue, however, such a position would unfairly shift the financial
Division limits payments to those eligible to make a claim on the fund to
$20,000 per person/$40,000 per accident. Id.
186. This is, arguably, the correct result because the insured should expect no
coverage from a policy procured by a material misrepresentation. ,
187. Appellant Douglas Wines's Brief at 35, Van Horn v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co.,
334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195 (1994) (No. 20, Sept. Term, 1990). The court of
appeals directed the parties to consider this "causal connection" alternative
when it ordered that the case be reargued. Van Horn, 334 Md. at 678, 641
A.2d at 199; see supra note 114 and accompanying text (listing Wines's proposed
alternative among the four additional issues to be discussed by the court during
reargument).
188. Appellant Douglas Wines's Brief at 36, Van Horn v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co.,
334 Md. 669, 641 A.2d 195 (1994) (No. 20, Sept. Term, 1990).
189. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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burden to the insurer without justification in the public policy of the
statutory scheme.
Joel P. Williams
